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Preserving the Third Temple: Israel's
Right of Anticipatory Self-Defense
Under International Law
Louis Renb Beres*
ABSTRACT

In this Article, ProfessorBeres discusses certain political tensions in the
Middle East and the appropriatenessof preemptive military action by
Israel. He concludes that the ongoing hostilities and threatening overtures by Israel's enemies could give Israel sufficient basis pursuant to
international law to conduct preemptive strikes. Upon reaching this conclusion, Professor Beres considers the level offorce Israel should employ
in various preemptive or counterretaliationscenarios. While the degree
of preemption is debatable, the author believes that the preservation of
Israel may require some preemptive action in the nearfuture.
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INTRODUCTION

"For what can be done against force without force?"'
As a forerunner of contemporary realists, Cicero understood the dilemma of peaceful intentions in a world driven by violence. Israel, enduring anxiously in the closing years of the twentieth century, has also
understood this dilemma. Aware that the Third Temple-the current
State of Israel-can- turn to ashes, its leaders have known from the
state's beginning in 1948 that national self-preservation can require
preemption.
How could they know otherwise? Born in response to a crime that
forever banishes hope in the promise of goodness, the Jewish State has
been fashioned in fire and sustained in blood. Animated by what happens when peacemaking is expressed as weakness, Jerusalem's decisionmakers have on occasion seized the initiative of military power, countering threats of yet another form of genocide with resort to anticipatory
self-defense.
As this Article will explain, such resort can be distinctly law-enforcing. The Babylonians (ancestors of present-day Iraq) destroyed the First
Temple and Commonwealth in 586 B.C. The Second Temple Commonwealth ended with Roman victory in the year 70 A.D. The Third Temple era, which began in 1948, will last only as long as Israel remains
attentive to Cicero's warning2 about force and remains prepared to act
preemptively in a timely manner. Such attentiveness and preparation
would be entirely consistent with the authoritative expectations of international law.
International law is not a suicide pact. Israel's overwhelming security

1.

MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, CICERO'S LETTERS TO His FRIENDS 78 (D.R.

Shackleton Baley trans., 1978).
2. In another context, Cicero, in his speech in defense of Milo, says: "But if there be
any occasion on which it is proper to slay a man-and there are many such-surely that
occasion is not only a just one, but even a necessary one, when violence is offered, and
can only be repelled by violence." And later in the same text:
[I]f our life be in danger from plots, or from open violence, or from the weapons of
robbers or enemies, every means of securing our safety is honorable. For laws are
silent when arms are raised, and do not expect themselves to be waited for, when
he who waits will have to suffer an undeserved penalty before he can exact a
merited punishment."
Speech of M.T. Cicero in Defense of Titus Annius Milo, in SELECT ORATIONS OF
M.T. CICERO 177-78 (C.D. Yange trans., 1892). Although, strictly speaking, Cicero
speaks not of anticipatory self-defense by states, but by endangered individuals, the argument not only applies to state action, but applies especially in that context.
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problems' with Arab states and Iran4 may compel Jerusalem to decide

3. For detailed information on these problems by this author, see Louis Ren6 Beres,
Israeli Security and Self-Reliance After the Cold War: Geopolitical Imperatives, Strategic Considerations and Tactical Options, Speech at the International Scholarly Conference, Security Regimes-Israel and Its Neighbors, Bar-Ilan Center for Strategic Studies
(June 3, 1992); Louis Ren6 Beres, The Real Bases of Middle East Instability, MIDSTREAM, June-July 1992, at 9; Louis Ren6 Beres, After the Scud Attacks: Israel, 'Palestine,' and Anticipatory Self-Defense, 6 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 71 (1992); Louis Ren6
Beres, After the Gulf War: Israel, Palestine, and the Risk of Nuclear War in the Middle East, STRATEGIC REV., Fall 1991, at 48; Louis RenE Beres, Israeli Security in a
Changing World, STRATEGIC REV., Fall 1990, at 11; The Growing Threat of Nuclear
War in the Middle East, 12 JERUSALEM J. OF INT'L REL. 1 (1990). See also Aharon
Levran, Threats Facing Israel From Surface-to-SurfaceMissiles, 19 IDF J. 37 (1990);
Moving in the Right Direction, ISRAELI DEMOCRACY, Fall 1989, at 12 (interview with
the then Defense Minister (now Prime Minister) Yitzhak Rabin); SHLOMO GAZIT &
ZEEV EYTAN, THE MIDDLE EAST MILITARY BALANCE 400 (1989); Gerald M. Steinberg, The Middle East in the Missile Age, 5 ISSUES IN SCI. AND TECH. 35 (1989). THE
INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES PROGRAMME FOR STRATEGIC
SECURITY STUDIES, ISRAELI SECURITY AND NUCLEAR WEAPINTERNATIONAL
AND
GRADUATE

ONS. (Geneva, Switzerland)
SIONAL PAPERS].

(Occasional Paper No. 1/1990) [hereinafter PSIS OCCA-

4. Iran is now a particularly great threat to Israel. That revolutionary Islamic state
displays both the requisite capabilities (including unconventional weapons) and intentions vis-i-vis the Jewish State. Regarding capabilities, a number of authoritative sources
state that Iran already has in place a number of nuclear weapons and is now acquiring
new delivery systems ranging from ballistic missiles to nuclear-capable artillery. See, e.g.,
Iran's Nuclear Weapons: Update II, Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional
Warfare, House Republican Research Committee, U.S. House of Representatives (Apr.
30, 1992). See generally The Fate of Nuclear Weapons in the Former Soviet Union,
CARNEGIE Q., Winter/Spring 1992, at 15; U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental
Affairs, 3 PROLIFERATION WATCH 12 (1992); ACTIVITIES TO PREVENT NUCLEAR

H.R. Doc. No. 135, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (Communication
from the President of the United States Transmitting His Annual Report Reviewing All
Activities of U.S. Government Departments and Agencies During Calendar Year 1990
Relating to the Prevention of Nuclear Proliferation, Pursuant to 22 U.S.C. § 3281).
WARREN H. DONNELLY & ZACHARY S. DAVIS, IRAN'S NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES AND
THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE 13 (1992). Iran is currently receiving several billion
dollars worth of arms from North Korea, China and Czechoslovakia. In March 1992 the
CIA confirmed that Iran had spent $2 billion on arms during the single fiscal year ending March 20, 1992. Iran and the Soviet Union made prior arms deals. Among Iran's
major purchases from the USSR were two squadrons of MIG-29 combat aircraft, T-27
tanks, and three diesel-powered submarines. Presently, Iran is buying new generation
weapons from Russia, which is honoring agreements signed in June 1989, between Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mikhail Gorbachev. See Claude Van England,
Iran Steps Up Arms Purchases to Prop Military, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Apr.
20, 1992, at 1, 4. Regarding intentions, Iran expresses an overriding obligation to destroy
Israel altogether, an obligation founded not in political differences (which are merely
epiphenomenal) but on theological anti-Judaism. See, e.g., AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI,
PROLIFERATION,
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once again between waiting for its enemies to strike first 5 and striking
first itself.6 From a strategic and tactical perspective, the choice of preemption 7 surely appears rational and cost-effective. 8 Significantly, inter-

PROGRAM FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ISLAMIC GovERNmENT 1970; ISLAM AND
REVOLUTION: WRITINGS AND DECLARATIONS OF IMAM KHOMEINI 127 (1981). See

also ROBERT S. WISTRICH, ANTISEMITISM: THE LONGEST HATRED, 219 (1991). Peace
with Israel threatens the life-blood of Islam. A fundamentalist publication, al-Da'wa,
clearly and unambiguously proclaims the status of the Jew, and therefore of Israel: "The
race [sic] is corrupt at the root, full of duplicity, and the Muslims have everything to lose
in seeking to deal with them; they must be exterminated." GILLES KEPEL, THE
PROPHET AND PHARAOH: MUSLIM EXTREMISM IN EGYPT 112 (1985).
5. Should Israel decide to wait for its enemies to strike first, the Jewish State would
likely maintain its traditional stance of disproportionately severe reactions to Arab aggression, reactions that represent an ironic inversion of the Jewish lex talionis. The Jewish Torah or biblical Pentateuch contains this law of exact retaliation-of "an eye for an
eye, a tooth for a tooth"-in three separate passages: Exodus 21:23-25; Leviticus 24:1721; and Deuteronomy 19:16-21. In contemporary international law, a state offended by
another state's use of force can, if the offending state refuses to make amends, take "proportionate" reprisals. See Naulilaa Arbitration, 2 RIAA 1013 (1928); Air Services
Agreement Arbitration, 16 RIAA 5 (1963), cited in INGRID DETTER DE LUPIS, THE
LAW OR WARD 75 (1987). The United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
of 1966 (Article 4) also contains evidence of the rule of proportionality. Similarly, the
European Convention on Human Rights provides, in Article 15, that in-time of war or
other public emergency, contracting parties may derogate from the provisions, but only
on the condition of rules of proportionality. The American Convention on Human Rights
allows in Article 27(1) such derogations in "time of war, public danger or other emergency which threatens the independence or security of a party" on condition of
proportionality.

6. In this connection, the Gulf War did not achieve neutralization of Iraqi nuclear
potential. On October 7, 1991, more than seven months after conclusion of hostilities,
United Nations inspectors discovered a complex of buildings that served as the nerve
center of Saddam Hussein's covert nuclear weapons program, but had only been "lightly
bombed" during the war. Here, at an installation called Al Atheer, about 40 miles south
of Baghdad, Iraq planned-according to the report-"to design and produce a nuclear

device." Paul Lewis, U.N. Aides Discover Atom Arms Center Concealed by Iraq, N.Y.
TiES, Oct. 8, 1991, at Al.
7. For the moment, SSMs (surface-to-surface missile) equipped with chemical warheads pose a major threat to Israel. Until it becomes possible to reliably intercept SSMs
in flight, Jerusalem will have to focus on destroying them while they are still on the
ground. Should this forceful option be undertaken as a preemptive strike in the near
term, effective active defenses could not complement it. If exercised several years from
now, however, "Arrow" missiles that are integrated into a multistage system for in-flight
interception of surface-to-surface missiles could likely reinforce it.
8. Preemption has often figured importantly in Israeli strategic calculations. This is
especially apparent in the wars of 1956 and 1967, and in the destruction of the Iraqi
nuclear reactor in 1981. Significantly, the failure to preempt in October 1973 contributed
to heavy Israeli losses on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts during the Yom Kippur war,
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national law might also permit preemption. Indeed, subject to certain
important constraints and conditions, the right of anticipatory self-defense is well established under international law.9

II.

THE JUSTIFICATION FOR PREEMPTIVE MEASURES

What does the plausible convergence of strategic 0 and jurisprudential
assessments of preemption suggest about Israel's prospective consideration of striking first? Above all else, it suggests that Israel need not necessarily be deterred from appropriate forms of preemption through fear
that its actions will be correctly described as criminal. Although, predictably, a substantial number of states will condemn Israel for aggression
under any circumstances, Israel could authoritatively and effectively
counter this charge-if its preemptive strikes meet the expectations of jus
ad bellum (justice of war) and jus in bello (justice in war) 1 -by referand-indeed-almost brought about Israeli defeat.
9. See Myres S. McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense, 57
AM. J. INT'L L. 597, 598-600 (1963) (acknowledging that prior to the U.N. Charter the
right of anticipatory self-defense was customary international law); PHILIP C. JEssuP, A
MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 166 (1950) (noting that the right of self-defense under customary international law included anticipatory actions against imminent threats).
10. The strategic assessment must now include the successor republics of the former
Soviet Union, including nuclear-capable Ukraine, Belorussia, and (especially) Kazakhstan. Already, a massive hemorrhaging of smaller weapons has occurred. Cities have
claimed the right to sell military equipment: Omsk is selling tanks and weapons, Ulyanovsk is selling four huge Antonov 124 military transports, similar to the U.S. Air Force
C-5, and the republic of Kazakhstan is selling SU-24 fighter-bombers. In addition to
Kazakhstan, the other five Muslim states to emerge from the wreckage of the Soviet
Union will find lucrative weapons markets in Iran and the Arab world. Moreover, Iran
has already bought, during April 1992, heavy military hardware from the non-Muslim
republic of Ukraine. Iran has purchased this hardware, which includes missiles, in part
with oil and gas. Some reports suggest that Iran has bought nuclear weapons from former Soviet republics. Kazakhstan alone, at this time, has more than 100 intercontinental
ballistic missiles on its territory, in addition to an unknown number of tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons. See generally John J. Fialka, Armed Forces of Former Soviet
Union Are Fast FallingApart, Analysts Say, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 1992, at 20; Daniel
Sneider, Kazakhstan Seeks U.S. Pact ForFurtherNuclear Cuts, CHRISTIAN SC. MONrrOR, Apr. 27, 1992, at 1.
11. According to the rules of international law, the international community must
judge every use of force twice: once with regard to the right to wage war (jus ad bellum)
and once with regard to the means used in conducting war (Uusin bello). The aftermath
of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 and the United Nations Charter have abolished all
right to aggressive war. However, the long-standing customary right of self-defense re-

mains, codified in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. Similarly, subject to conformance,
inter alia, with jus in bello criteria, certain instances of humanitarian intervention and
collective security operations may also be consistent with jus ad bellum. The laws of
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ences to international law.
The right of self-defense by forestalling an attack appears in Hugo
Grotius' The Law of War and Peace. 2 Recognizing the need for protection against "present danger" and threatening behavior that is "imminent in a point of time," Grotius indicates that self-defense is permitted
not only after an attack has already been suffered but also in advance,
where "the deed may be anticipated."' 3 Or, as he says a bit further
on in the same chapter, "It be lawful to kill him who is preparing to
kill. .. ,14
Emmerich de Vattel takes a similar poisition. In The Law of Nations,
Vattel argues that it is lawful to resist and even to anticipate attacks by
other nations so long as the aggression is truly forthcoming. 5
Appropriately, in view of present concerns, both Grotius and Vattel

war, the rules of jus in bello, comprise (1) laws on weapons; (2) laws on warfare; and
(3) humanitarian rules. Codified primarily at the Hague and Geneva Conventions, these
rules attempt to bring discrimination, proportionality, and military necessity into belligerent calculations.
12. Hugo Grotius, Of the Causes of War; and Firstof Self-Defense, and Defense of
Our Property, reprinted in 2 CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 168-75 (Carnegie Endowment Trust, 1925) (1625).
13. Id. at 173-74.
14. Id. at 177. Grotius' terminology raises an interesting related question-under
what conditions, if any, might assassination be identified as a permissible form of anticipatory self-defense? Understood as tyrannicide, international law has sometimes accepted
assassination as lawful (e.g., Aristotle's Politics; Plutarch's Lives, and Cicero's De Officiis). The argument that the right of tyrannicide may even qualify as peremptory (jus
cogens) derives from several authoritative sources of international law identified at Stat.
I.C.J. art. 38 (especially the "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations"
and "the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations .... ")
and-by extrapolation-from the decentralized, state-centric system of international law.

On this second foundation of the peremptory right to tyrannicide, because international
law creates a binding human rights regime without effective and centralized enforcement
mechanisms, support for this regime must, on occasion, require the use of force by individuals within states. In the absence of this particular form of self-help, the expectations
established by the entire corpus of the international law of human rights would have no
meaningful likelihood of satisfaction.
15. Vattel states that:
The safest plan is to prevent evil, where that is possible. A Nation has the right to
resist the injury another seeks to inflict upon it, and to use force and every other
just means of resistance against the aggressor. It may even anticipate the other's
design, being careful, however, not to act upon vague and doubtful suspicions, lest
it should run the risk of becoming itself the aggressor.
Emmerich de Vattel, The Right of Self-Protection and the Effects of the Sovereignty and
Independence of Nations, reprinted in 3 CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 130 (Carnegie Endowment Trust, 1916) (1758).
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parallel the Jewish interpreters, although the latter speak more generally
of interpersonal relations than of international relations in particular.
The Torah contains a provision exonerating from guilt a potential victim
of robbery with possible violence if, in self-defense, he struck down and,
if necessary, even killed the attacker before he committed any crime.1 6 In
the words of the rabbis, "If a man comes to slay you, forestall by slaying
him!""7
Grotius and Vattel both caution against abusing the right of anticipatory self-defense as a pretext for aggression,' 8 but Israel-in its current
configuration of ties to the Arab world-cannot possibly commit this

16.

Exodus 22:1.

17. Rashi; Sanhedrin 72a.
18. See generally, Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314
(XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp., No. 31, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975).
For pertinent codifications of the criminalization of aggression, see U.N. CHARTER Art.

2, 4; Declarationon the Non-use of Force in InternationalRelations and Permanent
Prohibition on the Use of Nuclear Weapons, G.A. Res. 2936, U.N. GAOR, 27th Sess.
Supp. No. 30, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972); Declarationon Principles of Interna-

tional Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR,
25th Sess. Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971); Declarationon the Inad-

missibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their
Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131(XX), U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess. Supp.
No. 14, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966); Resolution Affirming the Principlesof Inter-

nationalLaw Recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95 (1),
U.N. Doc. A/236 (1946); Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Annex to the
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279; Kellogg-Briand Pact
(Pact of Paris), Treaty Providing for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796, 94 U.N.T.S. 57. See also
Charter of the Organization of American States, April 30, 1948, chs. II, IV, V, 2 U.S.T.
2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 3 and Protocol of Amendment, Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607
(known generally as the "Protocol of Buenos Aires"); Charter of the Organization of
African Unity, May 25, 1963, arts. II, III, 479 U.N.T.S. 39; American Treaty on Pacific Settlement, April 30, 1948, 30 U.N.T.S. 55 (known generally as the "Pact of Bogota"); Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Sept. 2, 1947, 62 Stat. 1681,
121 U.N.T.S. 77 (known generally as the "Rio Pact"); Pact of the League of Arab
States, art. 5, March 22, 1945, 70 U.N.T.S. 237; Convention on the Rights and Duties
of States, Dec. 26, 1933, arts. 8, 10-11, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 (known generally
as the "Montevideo Convention"). For more on aggression, see DRAFT CODE OF CRIMES
AGAINST THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF MANKIND, adopted by the U.N. International
Law Commission in 1954, 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm. 150 (1954); revised in 1987, 1988, and

1989. U.N. Doc. A/42/420 (1987), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/404 (1987), U.N. Doc. A/43/
539 (1988), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/419 (1989), and U.N. Doc. A/44/150 (1989). See also
Declarationon the Right of Peoples to Peace, G.A. Res. 39/11/ Annex, U.N. GAOR,
39th Sess. Supp. No. 51 at 22, U.N. Doc. A/39/L.14 (1984).
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abuse. Because the entire Arab world, excepting Egypt,"9 considers itself
in a condition of war with the Jewish State,20 any Israeli preemption
against its Arab enemies would, in the strictest legal sense, not be an act
of anticipatory self-defense, but only one more military operation in an
ongoing and protracted war. 2 It follows that such an operation's legal-

19. Although Egypt is formally at peace with Israel, it remains a very cold peace
indeed, what Major General (retired) David Ivri, Director-General of the Ministry of
Defense, has called "a 15-year ceasefire." Commenting upon this assessment, former Defense Minister Moshe Arens told the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee on
April 14, 1992, that Egypt was decidedly not encouraging relations with Israel that

would lead to peace "in the full sense of the word." He also referred to Israel-Egypt
relations in the business, academic, cultural and tourist spheres as "very thin" because of
Cairo's negative policy. See Arens on Egypt Ties, JERUSALEM POST (Int'l ed.), Apr. 25,
1992, at 4.
20. The agreements that put an end to the first Arab-Israeli War (1947-1949) were
general armistice agreements negotiated bilaterally between Israel and Egypt on Feb. 24,
1949, 42 U.N.T.S. 251; Israel and Lebanon on Mar. 23, 1949, 42 U.N.T.S. 287; Israel

and Jordan on April 3, 1949, 42 U.N.T.S. 303; and between Israel and Syria on July
20, 1949, 42 U.N.T.S. 327. Pursuant to these agreements, the Security Council, on August 11, 1949, issued a Resolution which, inter alia, "noted with satisfaction the several
Armistice Agreements," and "[found] that the Armistice Agreements constitute an important step toward the establishment of permanent peace in Palestine and considers that
these agreements supersede the truce provided for in Security Council resolutions 50
(1948) of May 29, and 54 (1948) of July 15, 1948. Secuirty Council Resolution Noting
the Armistic Agreements and Reaffirming the Order to Observe an Unconditional Cease
Fire Pending a Final Peace Settlement, S.C. Res. 73, 1959, 4 U.N. SCOR, Aug. 11,
1949, Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council 1949, at 8, 1965, U.N. Doc. S/
1376, II, 1949. With the exception of Egypt, none of these armistice agreements has been
superseded by an authentic peace treaty.
A general armistice is a war convention, an agreement, or contract concluded between
belligerents. Such an agreement does not result in the termination of a state of war. The
1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land stipulates in the Annex to the Convention that "An armistice suspends military operations by
mutual agreement between the belligerent parties." (emphasis added). See Convention
No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, With Annex of Regulations,
Jan. 26, 1910, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539, 1 Bevans 631, at Ch. V, Art. 36. The courts
of individual states have also affirmed the principle that an armistice does not end a war.
See, e.g., Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U.S. 1 (1920). Indeed, throughout history, armistices
have normally envisaged a resumption of hostilities. It follows from this that since no
treaties of peace obtain between Israel and the Arab states with which it negotiated armistice agreements in 1949 (again, with the prominent exception of Egypt), a condition of
belligerency continues to exist between these states and Israel. For pertinent documents

and commentary on Israel-Arab agreements, see ROSALYN

HIGGINS, UNITED NATIONS

1946-1967 (1969) (presently a study issued under the auspices of the
Royal Institute of International Affairs).
21. At the conclusion of the recent Gulf War, the Bush administration announced
plans to sell Saudi Arabia, a country of six million inhabitants, an arms package of $24
PEACEKEEPING
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ity22 must be appraised exclusively in terms of its conformance with the
international laws of war (jus in bello).2" To identify such a preemptive
operation as an act of aggression against another state that has already

billion-including over 500 tanks, 48 F-15 fighter planes (increased to 72 in October
1992), Apache helicopter gunships, more than 30 Patriot batteries, tens of thousands of
armored vehicles, multiple rocket-launchers and command/control systems. Rationalizing
the Saudi demand for this vast arsenal by pointing to the "growing danger from Iran,"
the Bush administration ignored that such United States arms can be used for aggression
against Israel. Indeed, while a Saudi Arabia that joined in the coalition to defeat Saddam
Hussein now appears benign, this monarchy has been busily compensating the Assad
regime in Syria with billions of dollars in aid-money to be used entirely for Syria's
ongoing military buildup. Egypt, in addition to acquiring substantial military assets from
the United States, is developing its own home-grown missile, the Saqr-80 (which can be

launched from FROG-7 launchers), while Iran is deploying its domestically-produced
Oghab missile. For more on Arab and Iranian militarization, see Mark A. Heller, Coping with Missile Proliferationin the Middle East, 35 ORBIS 15 (1991). During the last
several months (May-October 1991), Pakistan has received new M-11 missiles from
China; Brazil may have concluded a secret deal with the Libyan Air Force to provide
technical assistance to service Libyan warplanes; China entered into a reactor project
with Algeria that may well have nuclear-weapon related implications; China exported
missile- or nuclear-weapons related technology to Egypt, Algeria, Libya, Syria, Saudi
Arabia, Iran, and Pakistan; Iran tested a modified version of the Soviet SCUD-C intermediate range ballistic missile and has reportedly spent, since March 1990, at least $200
million annually on a nuclear weapons program aided by Pakistan, Argentina, and
China; and Libya has negotiated with North.Korea for the purchase of a new IRBM
system. UNITED STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 2
PROLIFERATION WATCH 12 (1991).
22. Regarding such legality in an ongoing war begun by another state, we may recall
the opinion of Grotius in his Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty:
[I]t is obvious that a just war can be waged in return, without recourse to judicial
procedure, against an opponent who has begun an unjust war; nor will any declaration of that just war be required ....
For as Aelian says, citing Plato as his
authority-any war undertaken for the necessary repulsion of injury, is proclaimed not by a crier nor by a herald, but by the voice of Nature herself.
HUGo GROTIUS, DE JURE PRAEDAE COMMENTARIUS 96 (James Brown Scott ed. &
trans., 1964).
23. On the main corpus of jus in bello, see Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws
and Customs of War on Land, with Annex of Regulations, October 18, 1970, 36 Stat.
2277, T.S. No. 539, 1 Bevans 631 (known commonly as the "Hague Regulations");
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, Oct. 21, 1950, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea, Oct. 21, 1950, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Oct. 21, 1950, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Oct. 21, 1950, 6

U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
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declared itself at war with Israel would be nonsense.24
Iran's "neutrality" during the Gulf War and its subsequent expropriation of 132 Iraqi planes that were flown for safety to several Iranian
cities in the final phase of that war could especially justify Israeli preemption against certain Iranian hard targets. 25 Under current international law, Iran had no right to declare itself neutral. On August 2,
1990, the date of the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, the United Nations
Security Council adopted Resolution 660 condemning this act of aggression.2 6 On November 29, 1990, the Security Council adopted Resolution

24. Under international law, the generic question of whether or not a state of war
actually exists between states becomes somewhat ambiguous. Traditionally, nations held
that a formal declaration of war was a necessary condition before "formal" war could be
said to exist. Hugo Grotius, for example, divided wars into declared wars, which were
legal, and undeclared wars, which were not. HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR
AND PEACE 317, 321 (A.C. Campbell trans., 1901). By the beginning of the twentieth

century, the Hague Convention III codified the position that war exists only after a
conclusive declaration of war by one of the parties. More precisely, this convention stipulated that hostilities must not commence without "previous and explicit warning" in the
form of a declaration of war or an ultimatum. See Hague Convention III Relative to the
Opening of Hostilities, 1907, art. 1, 33 NRGT. Currently, of course, declarations of war
may be tantamount to declarations of international criminality (because of the criminalization of aggression by authoritative international law), and it could be a jurisprudential
absurdity to tie a state of war to formal declarations of belligerency. It follows that a
state of war may exist without formal declarations, but only if there is an armed conflict
between two or more states or at least one of these states considers itself at war, or both.
On the argument that war need not be formally recognized, see J. PICTET, GENEVA
CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR

20-21 (1958) ("no need for formal declaration of war, or for recognition of the existence
of a state of war"); U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, paras. 8-9 (1956) (noting that in instances of armed conflict without declaration of war law of war applies); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1862)
("[W]ar may exist without a declaration on either side"); see also MYRs S. MCDouGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 971-

113 (1961) (observing that legal status of war may be brought about by use of armed
force).
25. The number of expropriated Iraqi planes, 132 aircraft, is much larger than was
reported during the war. According to the Saudi newspaper, Asharq Al-Awsat, Iran confiscated $1.2 billion worth of Iraqi planes. As another commentator reported,
Officials of Gulf countries who asked not to be identified said they understood that
more than 100 of the Iraqi airplanes were military aircraft that are being absorbed
into Iran's Air Force ....

[T]he confiscated planes would provide the Iranian Air

Force with a strength it has not seen since the Iraq-Iran War and the cutoff of
American supplies in 1979.
Youssef M. Ibrahim, Teheran to Seize the Planes Iraq Sent to Iran for Safety, N.Y.
TIMES, July 31, 1992, at A6.

26, S.C. Res. 660 (Aug. 2, 1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1325 (1990).
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678, which authorized member states "to use all necessary means to uphold and implement Resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area.12 7 Resolution 678 was the last in a series of twelve Security Council resolutions
relating to the situation between Iraq and Kuwait.
No member of the United Nations may decide to remain neutral in a
war in which the Security Council has found a particular state guilty of
aggression. This denial of the customary right to neutrality has particular importance when the Security Council has called upon member states
to support collective military measures. This means that an Iranian attitude of impartiality toward the belligerents was impermissible and that
Iraqi armaments on Iranian territory are not legally immune from pre-

emptive destruction. Because it has been the object of extraordinary Iranian threats, Israel-so long as it operates within the established rules of
war-has a particular right to go after these planes in Iran.
Article 25 of the United Nations Charter supersedes traditional notions of neutrality under international law. It expects all members to
give the organization every assistance in any action it takes and to refrain from any assistance to a state against which the United Nations has
taken enforcement action. Article 25 further requires all members of the
United Nations "to accept and carry out" the decisions of the Security
Council. As for appropriate delegations of authority to the Security
Council, Article 24 of the Charter determines that this fifteen-member
body shall have "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security." Finally, Article 42 stipulates that the Security
Council may, under certain conditions, "take such action by air, sea or
land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international
peace and security," while Article 51 permits, but does not obligate,
United Nations members to take part in "collective self-defense."
In law and in practice, Iran's curious affirmations of "neutrality"
made that state a cobelligercnt of Iraq.2" By declaring itself "positively
neutral" in the hostilities, President Rafsanjani effectively placed Iraq's
attack on Kuwait on equal footing with United Nations military operations in the Gulf.
The implications of all this are substantial and far reaching. Lacking
protection of the traditional law of neutrality, Iran could now be fair
game for any Israeli military operation that is conducted in compliance

with the rules of war concerning discrimination (noncombatant safety),

27. S.C. Res. 678 (Nov. 29, 1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1565 (1990).
28. These affirmations involved the sheltering of an aggressor state's military
aircraft.
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proportionality (measured force), and military necessity.
Now, even if the state enemies of Israel had not declared a condition
of belligerence with the Jewish State, a condition amplified by open calls
for Israel's destruction,2" Israel's preemptive action could be entirely justified. Israel, in the fashion of every state in the world legal system, is
entitled to the right of self-defense. In an age of uniquely destructive
weaponry, including ballistic missiles, 30 international law does not require a state to expose its citizens to annihilation.31 This right of selfdefense, as we learn from Vattel, gives rise to the "right to resist
injustice." 32

29. There is, of course, nothing new about such calls concerning Israel's very existence. From the first, Arab states have regarded Israel as the institutionalized manifestation of multiple crimes, particularly colonialism, imperialism, and aggression. Indeed,
often denounced as "an instrument of evil," constructed "on a foundation of evil," Israel
is taken to be immutably criminal, irremediable, fit only for liquidation/extermination.
See, e.g., Y. HARKABi, ARAB ATTITUDES TO ISRAEL 307-10 (Misha Louvish trans.,
1972).

30. In early October 1991, Israel announced its agreement to join the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) by the end of the year. Conceived in April 1987,
MTCR seeks to control the transfer of highly sensitive missile technology from industrialized states to the Third World. By focusing on missiles carrying 500 kilograms payloads or more at ranges beyond 300 kilometers, MTCR seeks control of nuclear missiles.
For more on the problem of proliferating ballistic missile technology, see Steve Fetter,
Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction: What Is The Threat? What
Should Be Done?, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 1991, at 5; Aaron Karp, Ballistic Missile Proliferation,in STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, YEARBOOK 1990; Martin S. Navias, BallisticMissile Proliferationin the Middle
East, 31 SURVIVAL 225 (1989); JANNE E. NOLAN, TRAPPINGS OF PowER: BALLISTIC
IN THE THIRD WORLD (1991); ROBERT D. SHUEY ET AL., MISSILE
PROLIFERATION: SURVEY OF EMERGING MISSILE FORCES (1989).
31. In this connection, an Israeli nonnuclear preemption would reduce the risk of
regional nuclear war. This conclusion follows from the assumption that if Israel waits
for its enemies to strike first, these enemies may launch nuclear attacks, or-even if they
strike first with conventional weapons-Israel may have no choice but to resort to nuclear retaliation. This would enhance the reasonableness/legality of Israeli nonnuclear
preemption. Here, Jerusalem's commitment to anticipatory self-defense would be distinctly law-enforcing. No such defense, of course, exists regarding an Israeli nuclear preemption, which would, in all circumstances, be in violation of international law. MoreMISSILES

over, should Israel feel compelled to actually resort to nuclear war-fighting at some point,
either after (1) enemy reprisals for Israel's conventional preemption cause the Jewish
State to escalate to nuclear weapons; or (2) enemy chemical/biological/conventional firststrikes cause Israel to escalate to nuclear weapons, it would confront substantial

problems under international law. Should certain enemy states launch nuclear firststrikes against Israel, Jerusalem could retaliate using nuclear weapons with fewer jurisprudential problems, but matters of law in such circumstances would assuredly be moot.

32. According to Vattel,
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The customary right of anticipatory self-defense has its modern origins in the Caroline incident, which concerned the unsuccessful rebellion
of 1837 in Upper Canada against British rule (a rebellion that aroused
sympathy and support in the United States). 3 Following this case, the
serious threat of armed attack has generally justified militarily defensive
action. In an exchange of diplomatic notes between the governments of
the United States and Great Britain, then United States Secretary of
State Daniel Webster outlined a framework for self-defense that did not
require an actual attack.34 Here, the framework permitted military response to a threat so long as the danger posed was "instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation.""
In certain very limited and residual circumstances, assassination may
be a permissible form of anticipatory self-defense. However, classicial
philosophical and jurisprudential arguments supporting assassinations
are usually cast in terms of the tyrannicide motif. 8 Because it represents
an alternative or addition to standard military forms of preemption,
Israel could only undertake such killing when the danger posed to Israel
Justice is the foundation of all social life and the secure bond of all civil intercourse. Human society, instead of being an interchange of friendly assistance,
would be no more than a vast system of robbery if no respect were shown for the
virtue which gives to each his own. Its observance is even more necessary between
Nations than between individuals, because injustice between Nations may be followed by the terrible consequences involved in an affray between powerful political bodies, and because it is more difficult to obtain redress.... An intentional act
of injustice is certainly an injury. A Nation has, therefore, the right to punish
it. . . .The right to resist injustice is derived from the right of self-protection.
3 EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL
LAW 135 (Charles G. Fenwick trans., 1916) (1758).

33. See Beth M. Polebaum, National Self-Defense in InternationalLaw: An Emerging Standardfor a Nuclear Age, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 187, 190-91 (1984) (noting that
the Caroline case transformed the right to self-defense from an excuse for armed intervention into a legal doctrine).
34. See id. at 191 (citing R.Y. Jennings, The Carolineand McLeod Cases, 32 AM.
J. INT'L L. 82, 89 (1938)).
35. See id. (citing 61 PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (1843), reprinted in Jennings,
supra note 34, at 89).
36. Cicero, citing approvingly to the Greeks, offers enthusiastic support for
tyrannicide:
Grecian nations give the honors of the gods to those men who have slain tyrants.
What have I not seen at Athens? What in the other cities of Greece? What divine
honors have I not seen paid to such men? This is taken from Cicero's speech in
defense of Titus Annius Milo, a speech offered on behalf of an instance of alleged
tyrannicide committed by Milo, leader of Lanuvium.
Speech of M.T. Cicero in Defense of Titus Annius Milo, in SELECT ORATIONS OF M.T.
CICERO 174, 208 (C.D. Yange trans., 1892).
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meets the test of the Caroline. Thus, if the assassination were undertaken only to destroy the potential threat of an enemy, i.e., as a preventive action, it would not be permissible. If, however, the assassination
were undertaken in anticipation of immediate enemy aggression, i.e., as
a preemptive action, it could qualify as an instance of anticipatory selfdefense."7
This standard, of course, presents several problems. First, in the real
world, individuals may have difficulty making judgments concerning the
immediacy of anticipated aggression. Second, even where such judgments
are ventured, it can never be altogether clear whether the degree of immediacy is sufficient to invoke preemption rather than prevention. Third,
in meeting the legal requirements of defensive intent, a state may have to
act preventively rather than preemptively because waiting to allow a
threat to become more immediate could have decisively negative strategic/tactical consequences. Finally, the actual state-preserving benefits
that might accrue from assassination of enemy leaders hinge upon not
waiting until the danger posed is instant, overwhelming, leaving no
choice of means and no moment for deliberation.
Today, some scholars argue that the specific language of Article 51 of
the United Nations Charter overrides the Caroline articulation of the
customary right of anticipatory self-defense incidents."8 In this view, Ar-

37. Assessments of the lawfulness of assassination as anticipatory self-defense must
also include comparisons with alternative forms of preemption. If, for example, the perceived alternative to assassination is large-scale use of force taking the form of defensive
military strikes, a utilitarian or "balance of harms" criterion could surely favor assassination. Jerusalem may well have to make such a choice sometime soon, especially if the
territories are transformed into a Palestinian state. Here, deprived of strategic depth,
Israel could calculate that it had only three real options: (1) do nothing, rely entirely on
deterrence, and hope that enemy states remain dissauded from striking first; (2) strike
preemptively with military force against selected hard targets in enemy states, and hope
that persuasive intrawar deterrence prevents substantial reprisals, i.e., by compelling Israeli threats of unacceptably damaging counterretaliation; or (3) strike preemptively by
assassination, and hope that this will reduce the overall threat to Israel without escalating into full-fledged military encounters. Although impossible to determine in the abstract,

option (3) might well prove to be the most cost-effective and decent one available

in certain circumstances.
38. See IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES
272-75 (1963) (asserting that the United Nations Charter modified the international custom of anticipatory self-defense and that self-defense is justified only in response to an
actual armed attack); Quincey Wright, The Cuban Quarantine,57 AM. J. INT'L L. 546,
559-63 (1963) (interpreting Article 51 in conjunction with Article 33 to allow only a
"peaceful means" of dispute resolution and a prohibition on the use of unilateral force
until an actual armed conflict occurred); Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 14144 (2d ed. 1979) (arguing that the U.N. Charter restricts the traditional right of self-
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ticle 51 fashions a new and far more restrictive statement of self-defense,
one that relies on the literal qualification contained at Article 51 "if an
armed attack occurs." This interpretation ignores that international law
refuses to compel a state to wait until it absorbs a devastating or even
lethal first strike before acting to protect itself.39 The apparent weaknesses of the Security Council in offering collective security against an
aggressor reinforces the argument against the restrictive view of self-defense. Moreover, both the Security Council and the General Assembly
refused to censure Israel for its 1967 preemptive attack against certain
Arab states, signifying implicit approval by the United Nations of
Israel's particular resort to anticipatory self-defense. 40
Before Israel could persuasively argue any future instances of anticipatory self-defense under international law, it would have to show that it
had first sought to exhaust peaceful means of settlement. Even a broad
view of the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense does not relieve a state of
the obligations codified in Article I and in Article 2(3) of the United
Nations Charter.4 1 Strictly speaking, of course, these obligations should
not bind Israel because of the condition of belligerency declared by its
Arab enemies.4 2 As a practical matter, however, the global community

defense to those situations where an armed attack has occurred);

LELAND

M.

GOODRICH

300-08
(3d ed. 1977) (advocating a restrictive interpretation of Article 51 under which selfdefense is only justified in response to an actual armed attack).
39. Let us recall here Pufendorf's argument:
... where it is quite clear that the other is already planning an attack upon me,
even though he has not yet fully revealed his intentions, it will be permitted at
once to begin forcible self-defense, and to anticipate him who is preparing mischief, provided there be no hope that, when admonished in a friendly spirit, he
may put off his hostile temper; or if such admonition be likely to injure our cause.
Hence he is to be regarded as the aggressor, who first conceived the wish to injure,
and prepared himself to carry it out. But the excuse of self-defense will be his,
who by quickness shall overpower his slower assailant. And for defense it is not
required that one receive the first blow, or merely avoid and parry those aimed at
him.
2 SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, THE Two BOOKS ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZENS
ET. AL., CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS

ACCORDING TO NATURAL LAW

40.

32 (Frank Gardner Moore trans., 1927) (1682).

For pertinent resolutions of the Security Council, see T.M.C. AssER

INSTITUT,
RESOLUTIONS AND STATEMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 1946-

1989, at 456-578 (Karel C. Wellens ed., 1990).
41. Jewish religious law contains a similar imperative. "When thou comest near to a
city to fight against it, then proclaim peace to it," proclaims Deuteronomy 20:10. For
more complete examinations of war in the Jewish tradition, see Efraim Inbar, War in
Jewish Tradition, 9 JERUSALEM J. INT'L REL. 83, 95-96 (1987).
42. Although it is generally believed that the peace treaty in force with Egypt con-
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on the whole seems to have ignored this condition. It follows that Israel,
if it decides upon future instances of "preemption," should demonstrate
its prior efforts at peaceful settlement. 43 Such efforts, of course, are already a matter of record.
Interestingly, the origins of such advice have roots in ancient Israel.
Grotius, citing to Deuteronomy in The Law of Prize and Booty, claimed
that the Israelites were exempted from the issuance of warning announcements when dealing with previous enemies, what we might call
today ongoing or protracted war. This is precisely the condition that currently exists between Israel and all Arab states except Egypt.""
Looking over the more than forty years of conflict between Israel and
certain Arab states,45 Israel itself has generally defended its resorts to
strains that state from joining with other Arab forces against Israel, this belief causes
problems. The Israel-Egyptian Peace Treaty provides that the parties do not assert that
the Peace Treaty prevails over other treaties or agreements or that other treaties or

agreements prevail over the Peace Treaty. This means that the treaty with Israel does
not prevail over the defense treaties that Egypt has concluded with Syria, and that
Cairo-should it determine that Israel has undertaken aggression against Syria-could
enter into belligerency against Israel on behalf of Damascus. Indeed, even if Syria were
to commence hostilities against Israel to recover the Golan Heights, Egypt might abrogate its agreement with Israel and offer military assistance to Syria. Shortly after the
signing of the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty, then Egyptian Prime Minister Khalil
stated that he would regard any attempt by Syria to recover the Golan-Heights as a
defensive war, one that would bring into play the Egyptian-Syrian defense treaty despite
the existence of the Israel-Egyptian Peace Treaty. For terms of the pertinent treaties, see
Treaty of Peace, March 26, 1979, Egypt-Isr., Minute to art. VI(5), 18 I.L.M. 362, 392
and Joint Defense Agreement, Oct. 20, 1955, Syria-Egypt, 247 U.N.T.S. 117.
43. Unfortunately, Israel can never be sure with whom it should talk. In addition to
the difficulties of making peace with hostile Arab states, Jerusalem faces great confusion
in talking to the Palestinians.
44. The Israelites, recounts Grotius, had been commanded by God to "refrain from
making an armed attack against any people without first inviting that people, by formal
notification, to establish peaceful relations . .. ." "Yet," he continues, "the Israelites ...
thought that this prohibition was inapplicable to many of the Canaanite tribes, inasmuch
as they themselves had previously been attacked in war by the Canaanites.
"Hence," says Grotius, "we arrive at the following deduction":
Once the formality of rerum repetitio has been observed and a decree on the case
in question has been issued, no further proclamation or sentence is required for
the establishment of that right which arises in the actual process of execution. For
[and this is especially relevant to modem Israel] in such circumstances, one is not
undertaking a new war but merely carrying forward a war already undertaken.
Thus the fact that justice has once been demanded and not obtained, suffices to
justify a return to natural law....
GROTIUS, supra note 22, at 102.
45. For an authoritative assessment of the SCUD toll from 39 missile attacks in the
latest conflict, see SCUD Toll: Summing Up the 39 Missile Attacks, JERUSALEM POST
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military force as measures of self-help short of war. For the most part,
its defense of these actions has shifted the burden of jurisprudential responsibility for lawful behavior from the Arab states to Israel-an unfortunate shift because it focuses blame unfairly upon the Jewish State.
Furthermore, Israel has sometimes identified its uses of military force as
"reprisals," thereby choosing a problematic concept under international
law that compounds one legal mistake with another."' Under the current
Charter system of international law, the right of reprisal essentially
hinges upon self-defense. 47 Therefore, so long as Israel chooses to ignore
or downplay the declared condition of war announced by its enemies as
grounds for different legal justifications for resort to armed force, it
should confine its rationale of military operations to the continuing right
of self-defense. Because Israel now faces the threat not only of war, but
of genocide, this argument is even stronger.
"Genocide" has a precise jurisprudential meaning. Codified at the Ge-

(int'l ed.), Mar. 1, 1991, at 3. As indicated in this report, based on IDF-spokesman
accounts: "One person killed by a missile; 12 additional deaths resulting indirectly from
missile attacks. Nearly 200 persons injured in missile attacks. 1644 families were evacuated in Tel Aviv and Ramat Gan. 4095 buildings damaged; 3991 apartments and residential buildings, 331 public institutions, 17 educational institutions, and 54 businesses."

Id.
46. The United Nations Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Coopration Among States identifies the problem of reprisal as a
rationale for the permissible use of force by states: "States have a duty to refrain from
acts of reprisal involving the use of force." See Declaration on Principles of Interna-

tional Law ConcerningFriendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR,
25th Sess. Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 1292,
1294 (1970). For the most part, one may deduce the prohibition of reprisals from the
broad regulation of force in Article 2(4), the obligation to settle disputes peacefully in
Article 2(3) and the general limiting of permissible force by states to self-defense. At the
same time, a total ban on reprisals presupposes a degree of global cohesion that simply
does not exist, and circumstances may clearly arise wherein the resort to reprisal as a
form of self-help would be-distinctly law-enforcing. This is especially the case in matters
where reprisals are undertaken for prior acts of terrorism. See, e.g., Richard A. Falk,
The Beirut Raid and the InternationalLaw of Retaliation, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 415-43
(1969). J. STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER 43, 94-98 (1958) (arguing for a
continuing permissible role for reprisals under international law).
47. Although reprisal and self-defense are both forms of the same generic remedy,
self-help, an essential difference lies in their respective aim or purpose. Coming after the
harm has been absorbed, reprisals are punitive in character and cannot be undertaken for
protection. Self-defense, on the other hand, intends to mitigate harm. For a useful and
informed discussion of the distinction between reprisals and self-defense, see Derek
Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: A
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 394 (Richard Falk et al. eds., 1985).
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nocide Convention, a treaty which entered into force on January 12,
1951, it means any of a series of stipulated acts "committed with intent
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group as such ...2 8 The key to understanding and identifying genocide

lies in the "intent to destroy." Genocide can take different forms. The
perpetrators may transport victims to the gas or transport the gas to the
victims. Either way, the effect is the same: intentional mass murder of
defenseless civilian populations.4 9

48. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
opened for signature, December 9, 1948, entered into force, January 12, 1951, 78
U.N.T.S. 277. Although the criminalizing aspect of international law that proscribes
genocide-like conduct may derive from a source other than the Genocide Convention
(e.g., it may emerge from customary international law and be included in different international conventions) international law clearly makes such conduct a crime. Even where
the conduct in question does not affect the interests of more than one state, it becomes an
international crime whenever it constitutes an offense against the world community
delicto jus gentium. See Convention on the Political Rights of Women, done Mar. 31,
1953, 27 U.S.T. 1909,.T.I.A.S. No. 8289, 193 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force for the
United States, July 7, 1976); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, opened for signature, Dec. 19, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st
Sess. Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967), reprintedin 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967)
(entered into force, Jan. 3, 1976); American Convention on Human Rights, done Nov.
22, 1969, entered into force, July 18, 1978, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36 at 1, O.A.S.
Off. Rec. OEA/ser. L/V/II. 23, doc. 21 rev. 6 (1979), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673
(1970); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, openedfor signature, Dec.
19, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess. Supp. No. 16, at 52,
U.N.Doc. A/6316 (1967), reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967) (entered into force, Mar.
23, 1976). This Convention should be read in conjunction with the Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees, adopted by the General Assembly on December 16, 1966, and
entered into force, October 4, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. See also International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened
for signature, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, reprinted in 5 I.L.M. 352 (1966) (entered into force, Jan. 4, 1969); Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples, Dec. 14, 1960, G.A.'Res. 1514 (XV), U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess.
Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960); Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees, done July 28, 1951, entered into force, Apr. 22, 1954, 189 U.N.T.S. 137
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
done Nov. 4, 1950, entered into force, Sept. 3, 1953, Europ. T.S. No. 5; Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810,
at 71 (1948). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, The International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (together with its Optional Protocol of 1976), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights-known collectively as the
International Bill of Rights-serve as the touchstone for the normative protection of
human rights.
49. Jurisprudentially, this includes "crimes against humanity." For definition of
such crimes, see Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War
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Today, Iran and several of the Arab states prepare for another major
war with Israel,5" one they hope will finally send the Jewish State into

Criminals of the European Axis Powers and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, done Aug. 8, 1945, entered into force, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S.
279 (entered into force for the United States Sept. 10, 1945). The United Nations General Assembly affirmed the principles of international law recognized by the Charter of
the Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal as Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal,
adopted by the U.N. General Assembly, Dec. 11, 1946, G.A. Res. 95(I), U.N. Doc. A/
236 at 1144. This Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the
Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal (1946) was followed by General Assembly Resolution 177(11), adopted Nov. 21, 1947, directing the United Nations International Law
Commission to "(a) Formulate the principles of international law recognized in the
Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the judgment of the Tribunal, and (b) Prepare a draft code of offenses against the peace and security of mankind. . . ." See U.N.
Doc. A/519 at 112 (1947). The principles formulated are known as the Principles of
International Law Recognized in the Charter and Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal. Report of the International Law Commission, 2d session, U.N. G.A.O.R., 5th session, Supp. No. 12, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950).
50. Since the 1982 Lebanon War, Syrian forces have expanded as follows: an 80%
increase in regular armed forces (from about 240,000 to approximately 400,000); a 50%
increase in the number of armored and mechanized divisions (from six to nine); a 35%
increase in the number of main battle tanks (from 3,200 to about 4,200); a 200% increase
in the number of tactical ballistic missile launchers (from 33 to about 100); a 50% increase in the number of surface-to-air batteries (from 100 to about 150); a 45% increase
in the number of combat aircraft (from 440 to approximately 650); a 150% increase in
the number of attack helicopters (from 40 to about 100); a 40% increase in the number of
missile attack craft (from 20 to 28); and an absolute increase in the number of submarines (from zero to three). These quantitative increases in Syrian military strength have
been paralleled by increases in weapons quality. New and significant weapons systems
that have entered service with Syrian forces since 1982 include SS-21 tactical ballistic
missiles (range of 120 kilometers and a circle error of probability of 50 meters); Sepal
shore-to-shore or shore-to-sea missiles (range of 300 kilometers); a new range of surfaceto-air missiles (SAM), comprising the SAM-5, -11, -13 and -14, as well as improved
versions of the SAM-6 and SAM-8 missiles; T-80, T-72M and T-74 main-battle tanks;
BM-27 220-millimeter multiple rocket launchers; MiG-29 counterair fighters; AA-7 Acrid and AA-8 Aphid air-to-air missiles; new tactical C3 and electronic warfare systems
(including DR-30 and UR-1 remotely-piloted drones); and, perhaps most important,
chemical warfare delivery systems, including chemical warheads for tactical ballistic missiles. The combination of accurate ballistic missiles, the SS-21's in particular, and chemical warheads could provide Syla with a credible countervalue targeting strategy and
with the capacity to hit Israeli military targets (counterforce) as part of a first-strike or
retaliatory blow. For these details of the Syrian arms buildup and the expansion of Syrian military power, see Ahmed S. Khalidi & Hussein Agha, The Syrian Doctrine of
Strategic Parity,in THE MIDDLE EAST IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 190-92 (Judith Kopper & Harold H. Saunders eds., 1991).
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oblivion. 5 ' This desire is much more than a matter of heated rhetoric.
Current preparations, especially those in Syria,52 Lebanon, Iran, Libya,
and Iraq, 53 are designed openly and unequivocally with the "intent to
destroy" Israel once and for all.54

51. For example, the Iraqi officials responsible for the last war (including Saddam
Hussein) have yet to be apprehended and prosecuted according to the expectations of
international criminal law. Authoritative sources of these expectations can be found in
the 1973 Resolution on Principles of International Cooperation in the Detection, Arrest,

Extradition, and Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, G.A. Res. 3074, U.N. GAOR Supp., 25th Sess. No. 30, at 78, U.N. Doc. A/
9030 (1973). Other resolutions affirm that a refusal "to cooperate in the arrest, extradition, trial and punishment" of such persons is contrary to the United Nations Charter
"and to generally recognized norms of international law." See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2840,
U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 88, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971). See also G.A.
Res. 3074, U.N. GAOR Supp., 28th Sess. No. 30, at 78, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973);
G.A. Res. 96, U.N. Doc. A/64 at 188 (1946). As to the responsibility of states toward
Geneva law in particular, the Geneva Conventions addresses the obligation of all signatories "to respect and to ensure respect" for the Conventions "in all circumstances." See,
e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, art. 1, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (1955). Common Article 146 of
the Geneva Civilian Convention provides: "Each High Contracting Party shall be under
the obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be
committed... grave breaches.... ." See id. at 6 U.S.T. 3616, art. 146, 75 U.N.T.S. 386.

See also Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes
and Crimes Against Humanity, opened for signature by G.A. Res. 2391 (XXIII), Nov.
26, 1968, entered into force Nov. 11, 1970..

52. Syria's ongoing interest in some kind of military force against Israel has been
described as stemming from "

. .

. an apparently strong conviction that the struggle with

Israel is no more a political or territorial dispute, but rather a clash of destinies affecting
the fate and future of the Middle East." Ahmed S. Khalidi & Hussein Agha, The Syrian
Doctrine of Strategic Parity, in THE MIDDLE EAST IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 186
(Judith Kipper & Harold H. Saunders, eds., 1991). Moreover, Syria's approach to Israel
has been "bound up with the view that force, whether active or passive, is the final
arbiter of the conflict with Israel and the ultimate guarantor of any settlement in the
area." Id.
53. Iraq has been an active enemy of Israel from the start. Baghdad sent significant
numbers of expeditionary forces during the 1948 War of Independence, the 1967 Six
Day War, and the 1973 Yom Kippur War. During the 1948 war, Iraqi forces entered
Trans-Jordan and engaged Israeli forces in Western Samaria. In the aftermath of the
1967 war, Iraqi forces, which were again deployed in Jordan, remained there for more

than two years. During the 1973 war Baghdad committed approximately one-third of its
95,000-man armed forces to assist Syria in its campaign against the IDF on the Golan
Heights. For a comprehensive and authoritative prewar assessment of Iraq's threat to
Israel, see Yonathan L., Iraq: Regional Ambitions and TraditionalFears, IDF JoURNAL, Summer 1989, at 56-62.
54. From the standpoint of international law, these preparations constitute planned
aggression as, well as genocide. In this connection, Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter
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Such "intent" is much more than a matter of perceived geopolitical
necessity. It is, in its essence, a profoundly religious expectation. In Islam, the Prophet is said to have called for a Final Battle to annihilate
the Jews. Mohammed reportedly said that "[t]he Hour, [of salvation]
will not come until you fight against the Jews; and the stone would say,
'0 Muslim! There is a Jew behind me; come and kill him.' ""
Active support in the Arab world for genocide against the Jews is
already a matter of historical record. Even before the creation of the
State of Israel, such support was displayed enthusiastically and openly
during the Holocaust. On November 28, 1941, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin, met in Berlin with Adolph Hitler. The purpose of
this meeting, which followed Haj Amin's organization of SS troops in
Bosnia (where another form of "ethnic cleansing" is currently underway), was to ensure cooperation on "The Jewish Question." Haj Amin
insisted that all Jews be sent to countries "where they would find themselves under active control, for example, in Poland, in order thereby to
protect oneself from their menace and avoid the consequent damage." 56
Noteworthy also is that neither Palestinians nor other Arabs have ever
publicly criticized the Mufti's complicity in the Holocaust. During the
1950s and 1960s, Hitler remained an enormously popular figure in the
Arab world. Arab responses in to the 1961 Eichmann trial in Jerusalem
treated the Nazi mass murderer as a "martyr" and congratulated him
often for having "conferred a real blessing on humanity" by enactment
57
of the "final solution.1
III.

THE EFFECTS OF PALESTINIAN INDEPENDENCE

Overall, the situation is fraught not only with great danger58 but also
with considerable irony. Before Israel could even begin to move seriously

states: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use

of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." U.N. CHARTER
art. 2(4).
55. See ARAB THEOLOGIANS ON JEWS AND ISRAEL: EXTRACrs FROM THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH CONFERENCE OF THE ACADEMY OF ISLAMIC RESEARCH 51
(D.T. Green ed., 1976). See also ROBERT S. WISTRICH, ANTISEmITISM: THE LONGEST
HATRED 230 (1991).
56. See JOAN PETERS, FROM THE IMMEMORIAL: THE ORIGINS OF THE ARAB-JEWISH CONFLICT OVER PALESTINE 436-37 (1984) (reproducing the Mufti's own account of
his meeting with Hitler).
57. See WISTRICH, supra note 4, at 247. See also HARKABI, supra note 29, at 279.
58. Let us recall here that international law explicitly prohibits not only the use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state except in self-
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toward Palestinian independence as part of a two-state solution, 59 the
Arab and Iranian regimes currently preparing for a genocidal war
against the Jewish State would have to reverse those preparations. Israel
could not possibly afford to confront the risks of another hostile Arab
state on its borders unless its extant enemies moved toward regional
arms control. ° In the absence of a movement towards arms control, the
creation of Palestine"1 could affect Israel's inclination to preempt a hostile move. Because of its diminished size, Israel's inclination to strike first
at enemy hard targets would be especially high. Now deprived of its
strategic depth, Israel could not hold out for as long as it could when
Palestine was still the territories. Therefore, it is possible were it to come
into existence, that a shift in nuclear strategy from deliberate ambiguity

defense, but also the threat of force. In this connection, even in the absence of attacks
upon Israel, the persistent threats made by certain Arab states and Iran may constitute a
violation of the Article 2(4) prohibition on the threat of force.
59. Here one must recognize the jurisprudential fallacy in describing the territories
as "occupied." On this matter, see Louis Ren6 Beres, The West Bank is Not 'Occupied,'
BALTIMORE EVENING SUN, Sept. 20, 1990, at A17.
60. Significantly, as is obvious from recent events, inter-Arab violence has always
been endemic in the Middle East and would surely undermine regional stability
whatever Israel agreed to concerning the "Palestinian problem." For example, Egypt
occupied Yemen for eight years. Morocco and Algeria are routinely engaged in armed
confrontations. See Moroccan, Algerian Leaders Meet, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS
DIGEST, May 15, 1987, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File (reporting on
negotiations to end the 11-year war between Algerian-backed Polisario guerrillas and
Moroccan forces in the Western Sahara). Libya has clashed with Egypt, Tunisia, and
the Sudan. See AMERICA IN AFRICA, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 658 (1981)
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File (discussing the American reaction to
Colonel Qaddafi's "adventurism in Africa"). Finally, Saudi Arabia, which has recently
purchased CSS2-class surface-to-surface missiles from China that could reach any part of
the Middle East from Riyadh, finances Syrian arms acquisitions. See China Resumes
Missile Sales "to Raise Cash," FIN. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1990, at 6 (noting that the CSS2

has a range of 2,000 miles). Moreover, Arab states have been in conflict with non-Arab

states in the region other than Israel. For example, Libya has launched invasions against
Chad. See Libya Raids Town of Aouzou Amid ChadianVictory, Xinhua General Overseas News Service, Aug. 9, 1987, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Int'l File (detailing the skirmishes between Chad and Libya). Also, Syria has vowed to annex portions of
Turkey; Iraq began the first Gulf War with postrevolutionary Iran, and the second Gulf
War with its occupation of Kuwait.
61. The PLO, of course, has already declared itself a state. This declaration, however, does not satisfy the generally accepted criteria for statehood identified under international law. Those criteria include: control over a fixed and clearly defined territory; a
population; a government; and the capacity to engage in diplomatic and foreign relations.
See, e.g., Convention on Rights and Duties of States, done Dec. 26, 1988, 49 Stat. 3097,
T.S. No. 881, 3 Bevans 145, 165 L.N.T.S. 19.
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to disclosure would reduce the Israeli incentive to preempt, but only if
Jerusalem were made to believe that as a result of this shift, Iran and
the Arabs took Israel's nuclear threat more seriously. 2
At this point, several problems must be considered. First, how would
Israel's leadership actually know that taking the bomb out of the basement had improved its deterrence posture? To a certain extent, the credibility of Jerusalem's nuclear threats would be contingent upon the severity of different provocations. For example, it might be believable were
Israel to threaten nuclear reprisals in response to provocations that endanger the very survival of the Jewish State, but it would almost certainly be unbelievable to threaten such reprisals for relatively minor territorial infringements or terrorist incursions.6 3
Furthermore, for Israel's nuclear deterrent to function successfully
even after being removed from the basement, the arsenal would have to
be secure from enemy preemptive strikes. Moreover, Israel must also be
wary of what is called "decapitation," that is, losing the head of its military command and control system because of enemy first strikes. Should
62. The question of deliberate ambiguity versus disclosure is the central theme of
ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR STRATEGY (Louis RenE Beres ed.,
1986).
63. For current conventions in force concerning terrorism, see International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, adopted by G.A. Res. 34/146, Dec. 17, 1979, U.N.
Doc., A/34/36 (1983), GAOR, 34th Sess. Supp. No. 46, at 245; entered into force for
the United States, Dec. 7, 1984; European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism,
entered into force Aug. 4, 1978, E.T.S. 90; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents,
adopted by the U.N. General Assembly, Dec. 14, 1973, entered intoforce for the United
States, Feb. 20, 1977, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S., No. 8532, reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 43
(1974); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against The Safety of Civil
Aviation (Montreal Covnention), Sept. 23, 1971, entered intoforce for the United States,
Jan. 26, 1973, 24 U.S.T. 564; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft (Hague Convention), Dec. 16, 1970, entered into force for the United States,
Oct. 14, 1971, 22 U.S.T. 1641; Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (Tokyo Convention), Sept. 14, 1963, entered intoforce for the
United States, Dec. 4, 1969, 704 U.N.T.S. 219, 20 U.S.T. 2941; Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, done Apr. 18, 1961, entered into forcefor the United States, Dec.
13, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95. On December 9, 1985,
the U.N. General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution condemning all acts of
terrorism as "criminal." Never before had the General Assembly adopted such a comprehensive resolution on this question. Yet the issue concerning those particular acts that
constitute terrorism was left largely unaddressed, excepting those acts such as hijacking,
hostage-taking, and attacks on internationally protected persons that were criminalized
by previous custom and conventions. See U.N. Res. on Terrorism, G.A. Res. 40/61 December 9, 1985, U.N. GAOR 40th Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 301, U.N. Doc. A/40/53
(1985).
SECURITY OR ARMAGEDDON:
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Israel's enemies be unpersuaded by Jerusalem's move away from deliberate ambiguity, they might direct first strikes that could effectively immobilize Israel's order of battle.
A contrary argument about the effects of Palestine on Israel's inclination to preempt suggests that because of Israel's newly expanded vulnerability,6 4 its nuclear deterrent would have more credibility than ever
before. As a result, Jerusalem could more easily afford not to strike first
than when it still administered the territories. In this situation the principal benefit of shifting from ambiguity to disclosure would seem to lie in
an explicitly identified escalation ladder revealing a broad array of intended Israeli reprisals, ranging from limited conventional responses to
measured nuclear strikes.
In weighing the different arguments concerning the effect of Palestine
upon Israel's inclination to launch a preemptive action,6 5 one must consider Israel's presumptions about the inevitability of war and its longterm expectations for Arab and Iranian vulnerability. Should Israel's
leaders conclude that the creation of Palestine would make another major war inevitable, and that, over time, enemy vulnerability to Israel
would diminish, then Jerusalem's inclination to strike first would be increased. To a certain extent, Israel's tactical judgments on preemption
will be affected by antecedent decisions on nuclear strategy, namely decisions concerning countervalue versus counterforce objectives. Should it
opt for nuclear deterrence based on assured destruction or countervalue,
Jerusalem would likely choose a relatively small number of weapons that
might be inaccurate. A counterforce strategy, on the other hand, would
require a larger number of far more accurate weapons, ones that could

destroy even the most hardened targets. To a certain extent, going for
counterforce could make Israeli nuclear threats more credible. This conclusion is based on the assumption that because the effects of such
warfighting weapons would be more precise and controlled, this type of

64. This vulnerability would be even greater if transformation of the territories were
accompanied by a return of the Golan Heights to Syria. Should Israel relinquish the
territories and the Golan, all Israeli military airfields would be within range of modem
conventional artillery and would be covered by enemy radar. Under such conditions, the
Israeli Air Force might not even be able to get its planes off the ground. Furthermore,
even if the new state of Palestine and the Golan were demilitarized, enemy tanks could
cover the distance from the Jordan River to the pre-1967 border in three to four hours;
in the Golan, this time would be reduced to about one hour.
65. The creation of Palestine is itself dependent on the profound changes underway
in global power relations. On this matter, see Louis RenE Beres, Israeli Security and
Nuclear Weapons, PSIS OCCASIONAL PAPERS, supra note 3.
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weaponry would be more amenable to actual use.66
Yet, warfighting postures are likely to encourage preemption. If
counterforce targeted nuclear weapons are ever fired, especially in a proliferated regional setting, the resultant escalation could still produce extensive countervalue exchanges. Indeed, even if they averted such escalation, the collateral effects of counterforce detonations could still be
devastating.
One answer to Israel's needs in this regard may lie in counterforce
nuclear weapons of very low yield. Although tactical weapons are likely
to have destructive power generally comparable to the bomb dropped at
Hiroshima, Israel could deploy sub-kiloton nuclear weapons. Drawing
upon the distinctions offered recently by Thomas W. Dowler and Joseph
S. Howard II, both weapons effects and theater force analysts at Los
Alamos National Laboratory, these low yield weapons can be described
as (1) "micronukes" (yield on the order of 10 tons or 20,000 pounds of
high explosive); (2) "mininukes" (yield of about 100 tons); or (3)
"tinynukes" (yield of about 1,000 tons).67 These weapons could enhance
Israeli security by bridging the gap between its conventional weapon capabilities, in which Israel's comparative advantage is steadily declining,
and its higher-yield nuclear weapons, which it could not use without
grievous casualties or potentially catastrophic escalation by Israel's

enemies.
In making its nuclear choices, Israel will have to confront a paradox.
,Credible nuclear deterrence, which is essential to security and survival in
a world made more dangerous by the creation of Palestine, would require "usable" nuclear weapons. If, after all, these weapons were obviously inappropriate for any reasonable objective, they would not deter.

66. The term assured destruction refers to the ability of an attacked country to inflict
an "unacceptable" degree of damage upon an attacker after absorbing any first strike.
The term mutual assured destruction (MAD) describes a condition in which an assured
destruction capability is possessed by opposing sides. Counterforce strategies are those
that target an adversary's strategic military facilities and supporting infrastructure. Such
strategies may be dangerous not only because of the "collateral damage" potentially produced, but also because of the heightened likelihood of first-strike attacks. In this connection, collateral damage refers to the damage done to both human and nonhuman resources as a consequence of strategic strikes directed at enemy forces or at military
facilities. This "unintended" damage could involve large numbers of casualties and
fatalities.
67. See Thomas W. Dowler & Joseph S. Howard II, Countering the Threat of the
Well-Armed Tyrant: A Modest Proposalfor Small Nuclear Weapons, 19 STRATEGIC
REv. 34-40 (1991). Although the authors are concerned with United States nuclear strategy in the new security environment, I have adapted their thesis to Israeli needs and
interests in the Middle East.

136

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol 26.111

At the same time, the more usable the weapons became to enhance nuclear deterrence, it is more likely it that, at one time or another, they will
actually be fired. While this paradox seems to suggest the rationality of
deploying the least-harmful forms of usable nuclear weapons, the fact
that there would be no coordinated agreements with enemy states regarding deployable nuclear weapons points to a different conclusion-namely, that unless Israel calculates that the more harmful weapons would produce greater hazards for its own population as well as for
the people of the target countries, there is no tactical benefit to opting for
the least injurious usable weapons. 8
All things considered, Israel, especially if confronted by a new state of
Palestine, would be well-advised to do everything possible to prevent the
creation of Arab and Iranian nuclear powers, including taking pertinent
nonnuclear preemptive measures. 9 Bringing its own bomb out of the

68. In its decisions concerning nuclear weapons, Jerusalem will have to look far beyond tactical military calculations toward long-term political considerations. Israel's leaders will then doubtlessly discover that the weight of international opinion, both official
and public, is now more strongly arrayed against nuclear weapons than ever before, and
that a world led by denuclearizing major powers would be enormously hostile to any
first-use of nuclear arms in the Middle East. This statement does not imply that Jerusalem will likely reason that matters generating negative world public opinion should override expectations of national survival. The statement does suggest, however, that, given
sufficient incentives, Israel's leaders will be anxious to do everything possible to avoid
resorting to nuclear battles in the region.
69. On the "nuclear regime" under international law, including the antiproliferation
measures, see Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range
Missiles (INF Treaty), Dec. 8, 1987, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 88 DEP'T ST. BULL., FEB. 24,
1988; South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty, Aug. 6, 1985, reprinted in 24 I.L.M.
1440; Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies (Moon Treaty), Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,
U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 33, U.N. Doc. A/34/20 Annex 11 (1979);
Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Accords),
Aug., 1, 1975, Dep't State Pub. No. 8826 (Gen'l For. Pol. Ser. 298); Joint U.S.U.S.S.R. Statement (Vladivostok Agreement), Apr. 29, 1974, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 70 DEP'T
ST. BULL., JUNE 24, 1974, at 677; Treaty Between the United States of America and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon
Tests, July 3, 1974, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 71 DEPT. ST. BULL., July 29, 1974, at 217; Protocol
to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, July 3, 1974, U.S.U.S.S.R., 27 U.S.T. 1645; Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM
Treaty), May 26, 1972, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435; Interim Agreement Between the
United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, May 26, 1972, U.S.-
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basement is unlikely to serve any serious purpose unless Jerusalem were
to conclude that Arab/Iranian intractability toward the Jewish State had
become overt and overwhelming and that preparations for nuclearization
in particular enemy states could no longer be stopped, even by Israeli
preemptive strikes." ° Under these very portentous conditions, Israel
would require a very believable (and hence 'usable) nuclear deterrent,
one that could be employed without igniting Armageddon for all regional
belligerents and serve some damage-limiting military purpose (whatever
the collateral effects) against ememy weapons (nuclear and nonnuclear)
should deterrence fail.

U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3462; Declaration of Basic Principles of Relations Between the
United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, May 29, 1972,
U.S.-U.S.S.R., 66 DEP'T ST. BULL., June 26, 1972, at 898; Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), opened for signature July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483,
T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161; Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of
Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the
Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (Seabed Arms Control Treaty), openedfor signature Feb. 11, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 701, T.I.A.S. No. 7337, 955 U.N.T.S. 115; Agreement
on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States
of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Accident Measures Agreement),
Sept. 30, 1971, 22 U.S.T. 1590; Agreement Between the United States of America and
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Measures to Improve the USA-USSR Direct
Communications Link (Hot Line Modernization Agreement), Sept. 30, 1971, U.S.U.S.S.R., 22 U.S.T. 1598; Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin
America (Treaty of Tlateloco), Feb. 14, 1967, 634 U.N.T.S. 326; Treaty on Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty), opened for signature Jan.
27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205; Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Direct Communication Link (Hot Line
Agreement), June 20, 1963, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 14 U.S.T. 825; Treaty Banning Nuclear
Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (Partial Test Ban
Treaty), Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43; (16)
Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71. See
also Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and Protocol on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes,
May 28, 1976, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 74 Dm'T ST. BULL., June 28, 1976, at 802; SALT II
Treaty, June 18, 1979, U.S.-U.S.S.R., S. EXEC. Doc. Y, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., at 37
(1979).
70. The nuclear threat from Iran is discussed and underscored by Deputy Chief of
General Staff Amnon Shahak in his interview with Aon Pinkas, IDF is Better Than
Ever, JERUSALEM POST (int'l ed.), Apr. 25, 1992, at 2.
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ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR STRATEGY

A.

Nuclear Deterrence

The creation of Palestine, then, could have a dramatic effect on
Israel's decision concerning anticipatory self-defense. Israel's existing nuclear weapons status and strategy would also likely influence this decision.7 1 More precisely, should Jerusalem determine that Israel's nuclear
arsenal is strong enough to support preemption by deterring hostile target states from retaliating, this status could encourage Israeli nonnuclear
first strikes. If, however, Jerusalem were to calculate that these target
states would be unimpressed by threats of Israeli nuclear counterretaliation, this status might not encourage Israeli first strikes.
It is questionable whether the precise form of Israel's nuclear strategy
would make a difference in these circumstances. If Israel relies upon
nuclear weapons not to deter enemy first strikes, but to support its own

71. A substantial body of literature presently exists that deals with Israel's nuclear
weapons status and strategy. See, e.g., SHYAM BHATIA, NUCLEAR RIVALS IN THE MIDDLE EAST (1988); MITCHELL REISS, WITHOUT THE BOMB: THE POLITICS OF
NULCEAR NONPROLIFERATION (1988); WARREN H. DONNELLY, ENR, ISRAEL AND
NUCLEAR WEAPONS 14 (CRS Issue Brief) (Mar. 13, 1989); SHAI FELDMAN, ISRAELI
NUCLEAR DETERRENCE: A STRATEGY FOR THE 1980s (1982); ROBERT HARKAVY,
SPECTRE OF A MIDDLE EASTERN HOLOCAUST: THE STRATEGIC AND DIPLOMATIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE ISRAELI NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM (1977); FUAD JABBER,
ISRAEL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS: PRESENT OPTIONS AND FUTURE STRATEGIES
(1971); RODNEY W. JONES, SMALL NUCLEAR FORCES (1984); PETER PRY, ISRAEL'S
NUCLEAR ARSENAL (1984); PIERRE PEAN, LES DEUX BOMBES (1982); AVNER YANIV,
DETERRENCE WITHOUT THE BOMB: THE POLITICS OF ISRAELI STRATEGY (1987).

Shlomo Aronson, Nuclearizationof the Middle East,JERUSALEM Q., Winter 1977, at 2;
Uri Bar-Joseph, The Hidden Debate: The Formation of Nuclear Doctrines in the Middle East, 5 J. STRATEGIC STUD. 205 (1983); Yair Evron, The Relevance and Irrelevance of Nuclear Options in Conventional Wars: The 1973 October War, 7 JERUSALEM J. INT'L REL. 143 (1984); Alan Dowty, Israel and Nuclear Weapons, 22
MIDSTREAM 7 (1976); Alan Dowty, Nuclear Proliferation:The Israeli Case, 22 INT'L
STUD. Q. 79 (1978); Efraim Inbar, The Israeli Basement-With Bombs or Without?,
CROSSROADS, Winter/Spring 1982, at 8; Steven J. Rosen, Nuclearization and Stability
in the Middle East, JERUSALEM J. INT'L REL. 1 (1976); SECURITY OR ARMAGEDDON:
ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR STRATEGY (Louis Ren6 Beres ed., 1986). Three important books on
the subject, published in Hebrew, are: YAiR EVRON, ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR DILEMMA
(1987); HUMANITY IN THE SHADOW OF THE BOMB (Avner Cohen ed., 1987); DAVID

IsiH SHALOM, HORROR AND HOPE (1987). Additional useful bibliography can be found
in DONNELLY, supra, at 13-14. Donnelly also provides a very informative chronology,
beginning with Israel's bombing of the Iraqi reactor on June 7, 1981, and concluding
with Israeli-Norwegian consultation on Norwegian heavy water supplied to Israel on
December 15, 1988.
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conventional preemptive attacks, then it would have to choose between
continued ambiguity (implicit threats) and disclosure (explicit threats).
The question remains as to how Israel should best choose between its
options.
More than anything else, the answer lies in Jerusalem's confidence
that its adversaries already acknowledge Israel's nuclear capability. If
this confidence runs high, Israel has no valid reason to take the bomb out
of the basement. If, however, such confidence were low, the move to disclosure would assuredly be rational, especially because: (1) the provocation occasioned by the end of deliberate ambiguity would be unimportant
after the onset of Israeli first strikes; and (2) the predictably critical reaction by the United States would be less significant for Israel in the postCold War strategic environment.
The general belief throughout the Middle East and the rest of the
world is that Israel has a nuclear arsenal and that Israel's enemies share
this assumption. The most critical question about Israel's nuclear deterrent, therefore, is not one of capability, but one of willingness. How
likely is it that Israel, after launching nonnuclear preemptive strikes
against enemy hard targets, would respond to enemy reprisals with nuclear counterretaliation?
To answer this question, Israel's decisionmakers will have to put
themselves into the shoes of various enemy leaders. They must ask themselves whether these leaders would calculate that they can retaliate
against Israel without producing nuclear counterretaliation. In asking
this question, Israel's leaders will assume, of course, a nonnuclear retaliation against Israel. A nuclear retaliation, should it become technically
possible, would assuredly invite a nuclear counterretaliatory blow.
What will Israeli leadership conclude? This depends, in turn, upon
their view of Arab/Iranian reciprocal judgments about Israel's pertinent
leaders. Do these judgments suggest an Israeli leadership that believes it
can gain the upper hand with nuclear counterretaliation? Or do they
suggest an Israeli leadership that believes such counterretaliation would
bring upon Israel intolerable levels of harm and destruction? Also, depending on how they interpret Israel's authoritative perceptions, the enemy decisionmakers will either accept or reject the cost-effectiveness of a
nonnuclear retaliation against Israel. Therefore, Israel has an interest in
communicating the following strategic assumption to its enemies: that
Israel would be acting rationally by responding to enemy nonnuclear
reprisals to Israeli preemptive attacks with nuclear counterretaliation.
The plausibility of this assumption would be enhanced considerably if
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enemy reprisals involved chemical or biological weapons. 72
All these calculations, of course, assume rationality. In the absence of
calculations that compare the costs and benefits of strategic alternatives,
what will happen in the Middle East is only a matter of conjecture.
Significantly, the prospect of irrational judgments in the region is increasingly likely, especially as the influence of Islamic fundamentalism
spreads to Arab leadership elites.
Throughout the Islamic world"3 fundamentalists are now challenging
incumbent regimes, competing for power, and calling for a new assertiveness against Israel. 4 Unlike more moderate Moslems, these funda-

mentalists are disinterested in political compromise and are willing, in
many cases, to place the obligations of "submission" (Islam in Arabic
means submission to the will of God) above the requirements of personal

72. As we have seen, Israel already faces a very serious chemical threat. In spite of
the Conference on Chemical Weapons Use held in Paris, January 7-11, 1989, this threat
continues to grow.
73. In considering this "Islamic world," one must not fail to include Saudi Arabia.
Although long regarded by Washington as a "moderate Arab" state (one that has no
strong and active opposition to Israel), Saudi Arabia did precede every other Muslim and
Arab state in its open expression of virulent antisemitism. Even before World War II,
King Abd al Aziz ibn Sa'ud deplored "the strange hypnotic influence which the Jews, a
race accursed by God according to His Holy Book, and destined to final destruction and
eternal damnation," appeared to exercise over his people. Foreign Office File 371/20822
E 7201/22/31, reproduced and elucidated by ELE KEDOURIE, ISLAM AND THE MODERN WORLD AND OTHER STUDIES

71 (1980). See also WISTRICH, supra note 4, at 232.

Curiously, Ibn Sa'ud's strong hatred of the Jews paralleled the Christian core of antisemitism: "Our hatred for the Jews dates from God's condemnation of them for their
persecution and rejection of Isa (Jesus Christ), and their subsequent rejection later of
His chosen Prophet" See id. On another occasion, King Sa'ud informed a British visitor
to his court: "Verily, the word of God teaches us, and we implicitly believe it, that for a
Muslim to kill a Jew, or for him to be killed by a Jew, ensures him an immediate entry
into Heaven and into the august presence of God Almighty." Id. King Feisal, in the
tradition of his father, was known for distributing copies of The Protocols of the Elders
of Zion (for which the Arab world is the largest global market today) to all visiting
dignitaries. King Feisal also gave a copy to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who is
Jewish.
74. See Barbara Crossette, U.S. Official Calls Muslim Militants a Threat to Africa,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1992, at A3 (quoting Isaz Gilanijan, an Islamic scholar and adviser
to Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, that Islam's resurgence is occurring in eco-

nomically weak societies);

Youssef M. Ibrahim, Algeria and Tunisia Intensify Anti-

FundamentalistEfforts, N.Y. Tis,
Dec. 19, 1991, at A10 (reporting that Algeria and
Tunisia fear attempted overthrows of their governments by Islamic fundamentalists);
Yehudit Ronen, Libya's FundamentalistChallenge, JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 11, 1990,
at 1 (describing the growing fundamentalist threat to Colonel Qaddafi's regime in
Libya).
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or collective survival. 5 Moreover, their power grows daily as a number
of Arab states are increasingly unable to surmount substantial social,
6
medical, and economic problems.7
In Egypt, the palpable reassertion of Muslim piety is directed toward
a day when all irreligious leaders are deposed and the Ummah (total
community of Muslims) is united under a universal Caliphate, a fully
legitimate government ruled by an elected leader of irreproachable integrity. Whereas Iran's religious faith is drawn primarily from the minority
Shi'a branch of Islam, Egypt's fundamentalists look forward to an alliance with over 130 million Sunni Muslims in the rest of the Middle
East and North Africa (there are now nearly 1 billion Muslims in the
world). 7 7 This kind of alliance, led by the so-called Jaamat Islamiya
(Islamic societies) and including Al-Jihad (Holy War), could lead to a
position of "no compromise" with infidels,78 especially if it is heavily
informed by the Manichean type dualism of Sayyid Qutb."
Yet, the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty could fail even if Muslim radicals
fail to overthrow Egyptian President Mubarak. Similarly, the late Egyptian President Sadat was always careful to maintain that the Treaty was
"founded on Islamic rules, because it arises from a position of strength,
after the holy war and victory Egypt achieved on 10th Ramadan 1393
[October 1973]."' "° These "Islamic rules," moreover, derive fiom Mohammed's truce with the Jews. The rules are, therefore, "only a temporary expedient," and are "far from accepting either the Jewish claim to
75. See Libya's Challenge, supra note 75 (quoting Colonel Qaddafi's characterization of fundamentalists as "mad dogs" and "more dangerous than cancer and AIDS").

76. See Chris Hodges, Tunisia Cracks Down Harder on Muslim Militants, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 20, 1992, at A3 (describing the Tunisian government's measures to control
the fundamentalist movement and referencing similar struggles in Egypt, Morocco, and
Algeria).

77. See Iran Rafsanjani and Khomenei Speak on Islam's World Role at Dawn
Anniversary, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Feb. 4, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Int'l File (describing the role of Islam from the Iranian point of view);
Mecca Clashes Highlight Differences Among Moslems, REuTERs LIBRARY REPORT,
Aug. 1, 1987, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Int'l File (noting the different countries in which Sunni and Shi'a Moslems predominate).
78. Islam has historically sought to establish a world public order based on divine
legislation and enforced by the jihad.The jihad is the Islamic bellumjustum and is the
very basis of Islam's relationships with other nations. For an authoritative study of Islam

and international law,

see THE ISLAMIC LAW OF NATIONS: SHAYBANI'S SIYAR

(Majid

Khadduri trans., 1966).
79. See EMMANUEL SIvAN, RADICAL ISLAM: MEDIEVAL THEOLOGY AND MODERN
PoLr1ics (1985) (discussing the philosophy and ideology of Sayyid Qutb). Qutb, born in
1906, was a leading idealogue of the Brotherhood who was hanged by Nasser in 1966.
80. See WIsmRICH, supra note 4, at 231.
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nationhood or legitimate historical roots for a Jewish State in Palestine."8 1 Therefore, it goes without saying that a pact with an illegitimate
State of Israel can never be binding upon Egypt.
Should Egypt's fundamentalists succeed in assassinating Mubarak and
replacing him with their own brand of authentic religious leadership,
even tactically mandated ties to Israel would then surely be rejected. Together with the disappearance of "palace ulema," an ironic designation
of learned men who do not faithfully devote themselves to the study of
the Holy Law of Islam (because they reflect the timidity, servility, and
pseudo-religiosity of a corrupt establishment), a political victory by the
fundamentalist preachers would remove even the veneer of dialogue with
Israel. Because Muslim activists regard even tactical and conditional acceptance of the Jewish State as a contradiction to Islam and as a negation of Egypt's Islamic identity, such a victory would bring long-term
enmities far out into the open.82
The problem of Islamic fundamentalism is already an internal problem for Israel. Although fundamentalists ordinarily view Palestinian nationalism as contrary to Islamic universalism, they are increasingly trying to gain control of the Palestinian resistance, both in Israel proper
and in the territories. In calling for an escalation of the uprising and a

denunciation of all compromise with Israel, the groups Hamas and
Hezbollah see only one strategy of confrontation: the formation of underground groups serving as military units to strike at Israeli interests. In a
memorandum offered to the Palestine National Council dated April 6,
1990, and reported in The Jerusalem Post on April 21, 1990, Hamas
demanded that PNC Chairman Sheikh Abdul Hamid As-sayih confirm
the military option and that he considered fihad the proper way to liberate Palestine and achieve independence.83 Should the West Bank and
Gaza Strip become Palestine, groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah
would likely wield enormous power and could possibly act as surrogates
for Iran or those Arab states hostile to Israel."

81. Id.
82. See Israel Altman, Islamic Movements in Egypt, 10

JERUSALEM

Q. 87 (1979);
POLITICS

EMMANUEL SIVAN, RADICAL ISLAM: MEDIEVAL THEOLOGY AND MODERN

52 (1985).
83. See Nissim Rejwan, Hamas: 'From the Sea to the River,' JERUSALEM POST,
Dec. 19, 1990, at I (reporting on the conditions contained in the April 6, 1990
memorandum).
84. Indirectly, via its Hezbullah surrogates in southern Lebanon, Iran is already
actively engaged with Israeli forces. Directly, and in partial collaboration with Libya,
Iran is procuring substantial numbers of long-range missiles with chemical warheads.
Moreover, it continues to seek a nuclear weapons capability.
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To the extent that Israel might one day believe that it is confronted
with irrational enemies, particularly enemies with highly destructive
weapons in their arsenals, its incentive to preempt could become overwhelming. In fact, should Israel believe that these enemies hold nuclear
weapons,8" it might even (rationally) decide to launch a nuclear preemption against these weapons. This would appear to be the only case in
which a rational Israeli preemptive strike could be nuclear.
Israel's enemies should understand from this discussion that conditions
exist wherein Jerusalem might decide to actually use its nuclear weapons. These conditions concern the intolerable prospect of total defeat.
Faced with imminent destruction of the Third Temple, Israel's leaders
would almost certainly do whatever is needed to survive, including
resorting to nuclear retaliation, nuclear counterretaliation, nuclear pre-

Iran's developing capabilities, therefore, are threatening to the safety of Israel. What
about Iran's intentions, however? The April 1992 elections, in which voters elected their
first post-revolutionary parliament composed primarily of moderate reformers, seemed to
suggest that President Hashemi Rafsanjani might move Iran toward more "mainstream"
foreign relations. Yet the new parliament has remained staunchly committed to keeping
Iran as a doctrinaire Islamic state and has assuredly not made any conciliatory moves
toward Israel ("the Zionist enemy").
From October 19-22, 1992, the prior parliament of the Islamic Republic of Iran sponsored the "International Conference to Support the Islamic Revolution of Palestine."
The conference opened with Iranian President Rafsanjani's declaration of Iran's willingness to send troops to war against Israel and included such delegates as Damascus-based
Ahmed Jibril of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command;
"Colonel" Abu Mussa, Head of the anti-Arafat faction of Fatah (also based in Damascus); Sheikh Tamimi and Dr. Fathi Shakaki, leaders of Islamic Jihad; Hamas representative Ibrahim Rusheh; and, of course, Hezbullah. Every delegate signed all twenty-eight
resolutions issued at the conference, including a call for the "elimination of the Zionist
existence" (Resolution #3), and affirmed "the need for an all-outjihad against the Zionist regime" (Resolution #22).

85.

International law views any use of nuclear weapons by an insurgent group as a

serious violation of the laws of war. Article 3, common to the four Geneva Conventions
of August 12, 1949, and the two protocols to the conventions bring to bear these laws
upon nonstate participants in world politics. Protocol I makes the law concerning international conflicts applicable to conflicts fought for self-determination, those fought
against alien occupation and against colonialist and racist regimes. A product of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts that ended on June 10, 1977, this protocol,
which was justified by the decolonization provisions of the United Nations Charter and
by resolutions of the General Assembly, brings irregular forces within the full scope of
the law of armed conflict. Protocol II, also additional to the Geneva Conventions, concerns the protection of victims of noninternational armed conflicts. Hence, this protocol
applies to those armed conflicts that are not covered by Protocol I and that take place
within the territory of a state between its armed forces and dissident armed forces.

144

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 26:111

emption, and nuclear warfighting8
B.

Nuclear Retaliation

Should an enemy state or alliance of states launch a nuclear firststrike against Israel, Jerusalem would certainly respond with a nuclear
retaliatory strike to the greatest extent possible. If enemy first-strikes
were to involve other forms of unconventional weapons (chemical or biological weapons, for example), Israel might launch a nuclear reprisal.
The probability of this type of reprisal depends in large measure upon
Jerusalem's expectations of follow-up aggression and on its associated
calculations of comparative damage limitation. If Israel absorbed a massive conventional attack, a nuclear retaliation could still be an option,
especially if: (a) Israel's leaders perceived that the aggressors had nuclear
or other unconventional weapons in reserve; or (b) Israel's leaders believed that nonnuclear retaliations could not prevent destruction of the
Third Temple. A nuclear retaliation by Israel could be ruled out only in

86.

For assessments of nuclear weapons under international law, see NUCLEAR
(Istvan Pogany ed., 1987); The Illegality of Nuclear Weapons: Statement of the Lawyer's Committee on Nuclear Policy, 8 ALTERNAWEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

TIVES 291-96 (1982); GEOFFREY BEST, HUMANITY IN WARFARE (1980); RICHARD
FALK ET. AL., NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1981); JAMES TURNER
JOHNSON, JUST WAR TRADITION AND THE RESTRAINT OF WAR (1981); Daniel J.

Arbess, The InternationalLaw of Armed Conflict in Light of ContemporaryDeterrence
Strategies: Empty Promise or Meaningful Restraint?, 30 McGiuL L.J. 736-44 (1945);
Francis A. Boyle, The Criminality of Nuclear Weapons, booklet 27, at 13 (Nuclear Age
Peace Foundation, 1991); Ian Brownlie, Some Legal Aspects of the Use of Nuclear
Weapons, 14 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 437 (1965); Francis A. Boyle, The Relevance of
InternationalLaw to the 'Paradox'of Nuclear Deterrence,80 Nw. U. L. REv. 1407-48
(1986); John H.E. Fried, The Nuclear Collision Course: Can InternationalLaw Be of
Help?, 14 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 97-120 (1985); John H.E. Fried, First Use of
Nuclear Weapons-Existing Prohibitionsin InternationalLaw, BULL. PEACE PROPOSALS 21-29 (1981); Matthew Lippman, Nuclear Weapons and InternationalLaw: Towards a Declaration on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Nuclear
Humanicide," 8 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMp. L.J. 183-234 (1986); Elliott L. Meyrowitz,
The Opinions of Legal Scholars on the Legal Status of Nuclear Weapons, 24 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 111-77 (1987); John Norton Moore, Nuclear Weapons and the Law: Enhancing Strategic Stability, 9. BROOK. J. INT'L L. 263-68 (1983); Eugene V. Rostow, The
Great Nuclear Debate, 8 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 87-102 (1981); James A. Stegenga, Nuclearism and InternationalLaw, 4 PUB. AFF. Q. 69-80 (1990); Ellery C.
Stowell, Laws of War and the Atomic Bomb, 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 784-88 (1945); Elbert
D. Thomas, Atomic Bombs in InternationalSociety, 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 736-44 (1945);
Burns Weston, Nuclear Weapons and International Law: Illegality in Context, 13
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL. (1983); Burns H. Weston, Nuclear Weapons Versus International Law: A Contextual Reassessment, 6 McGiLL L.J. 543-90 (1983).
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circumstances in which enemy aggression were clearly conventional,
"typical," (i.e., consistent with previous instances of Arab attacks in degree and intent), and hard-target directed.
C.

Nuclear Counterretaliation

Should Israel feel compelled to preempt enemy aggression with conventional weapons, the target state's response would largely determine
Jerusalem's next moves. If the target responded in a nuclear fashion,
Israel would assuredly resort to nuclear counterretaliation. If the target's
retaliation involved chemical or biological weapons, Israel might also feel
pressed to take the escalatory initiative (again, depending upon its judgments of enemy intent and calculations of essential damage limitation).
Should the enemy response to Israel's preemption be limited to hardtarget conventional strikes, the Jewish State would not likely move on to
nuclear counterretaliations. If, however, the enemy conventional retaliation were all-out and directed toward civilian populations as well as toward military targets, an Israeli nuclear counterretaliation could not be
ruled out. Apparently, such a counterretaliation could be ruled out only
if the enemy conventional retaliation were entirely proportionate to
Israel's preemption, confined exclusively to Israeli hard-targets, circumscribed by the jurisprudential limits of military necessity, and accompanied by explicit and verifiable assurances of nonescalatory intent.
D.

Nuclear Preemption

Israel will likely never decide to launch a preemptive nuclear strike.
Although circumstances might arise when such a strike would be perfectly rational (that is, when the prospective benefits of the strike would
outweigh the prospective costs), it is implausible that Israel would allow
itself to reach these circumstances. Moreover, unless the nuclear weapons
involved were used in a fashion consistent with the authoritative expectations of the laws of war, which are the limits of discrimination, proportionality, and military necessity, this form of preemption would clearly
represent an egregious violation of international law. Even if such consistency were possible, the psychological and political impact on the
world community would be negative and far-reaching. It follows that
Israel would use nuclear preemption only when: (a) Israel's enemies acquired nuclear or other unconventional weapons judged capable of destroying the Third Temple, (b) these enemies had made clear that their
intentions paralleled their capabilities; (c) these enemies were believed
ready to begin a "countdown to launch"; and (d) Jerusalem believed that
Israeli nonnuclear preemptions could not achieve needed minimum levels
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of damage limitation (i.e., levels consistent with preservation of the
Third Temple).
E. Nuclear Warfighting
Should nuclear weapons be introduced into a conflict between Israel
and its enemies, whether by the Jewish State or by an Arab/Iranian foe,
nuclear warfighting, at one level or another, would ensue. This would
hold true as long as: (a) enemy first-strikes against Israel do not destroy
Jerusalem's second-strike nuclear capability; (b) enemy retaliations for
Israeli conventional preemption do not destroy Jerusalem's nuclear
counterretaliatory capability; (c) Israeli preemptive strikes involving nuclear weapons do not destroy Arab/Iranian second-strike nuclear capabilities; and (d) Israeli retaliation for enemy conventional first-strikes
does not destroy Arab/Iranian nuclear counterretaliatory capability.
Therefore, from an examination of Israel's strategic requirements, Jerusalem should now seek to ensure the likelihood of categories (a) and (b)
above, and the unlikelihood of categories (c) and (d). This means, among
other things, that Israel should strengthen the hard-target kill capacity of
its survivable nuclear forces.
What, exactly, would a nuclear war mean? Even the most limited nuclear war could signal catastrophe.8 7 The immediate effects of the warhead explosions-thermal radiation, nuclear radiation, and blast damage-could cause wide swaths of death and devastation. Victims would
suffer flash and flame burns. Retinal burns could occur in the eyes of
persons located several hundred miles from the explosion. People could
be crushed by collapsing buildings or torn by flying glass. Others could
fall victim to raging firestorms and conflagrations. Fall-out injuries
would include whole-body radiation injury produced by penetrating,
hard gamma radiation, superficial radiation burns produced by soft radiations, and injuries produced by deposits of radioactive substances within
the body.
In the aftermath of a nuclear conflict, any medical facilities that might
still exist would be stressed beyond endurance. Water supplies could become unusable as a result of pervasive contamination. Housing and shelter could be unavailable for the survivors. Transportation and communication could break down to almost prehistoric levels, and overwhelming
87. A large body of literature deals with the expected consequences of a nuclear war.
For works by this author, see, for example, SECURITY OR ARMAGEDDON: ISRAEL'S NuCLEAR STRATEGY (1986); REASON AND REALPOLITIK: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND
WORLD ORDER (1984); MIMICKING SISYPHUS: AMERICA'S COUNTERVAILING NULCEAR
STRATEGY (1983); APOCALYPSE: NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE IN WORLD POLITICS (1980).
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food shortages could become the rule for at least several years.
Because the countries involved would have entered into war as modern
industrial economies, their networks of highly interlocking and interdependent exchange systems might now be shattered. Emergency fire and
police services could be decimated altogether. Systems dependent upon
electrical power might cease to function. Severe trauma would occasion
widespread disorientation and psychological disorders for which there
might be no therapeutic services.
With the passage of time, many of the survivors could expect an increased incidence of degenerative diseases and various kinds of cancer.
Survivors might also expect premature death, impairment of vision, and
a high probability of sterility. Among the survivors of Hiroshima, for
example, an increased incidence of leukemia and cancer of the lung,
stomach, breast, ovary, and uterine cervix has been widely documented."8
None of the above discussion is meant to suggest that an Israeli firststrike would give rise to nuclear war. On the contrary, Israel's resort to
nonnuclear preemption might be the optimal way to prevent nuclear
war. Indeed, unless Jerusalem's regional adversaries soon begin to cease
their persistent and lawless threats to Israel's existence, the nonnuclear
preemption resort may be the Jewish State's only reasonable alternative
to possible annihilation.
V.

CONCLUSION

Plus qa change, plus c'est la mgme chose. The more things change,
the more they remain the same. Despite its extraordinary steps to preserve the Third Temple, the State of Israel remains subject to grave
threats of harm. Indeed, in the fashion of the First and Second Temples,

Israel could even face extinction.
To prevent this fate and to preserve the Third Temple, Israel can
resort to the protections afforded by anticipatory self-defense under international law. Mediating between survival and chaos, these protections
offer the Jewish State an essential opportunity to confront force with
force, not to initiate war but to prevent oblivion. Although, in the best of
all possible worlds, preemption would be unnecessary and therefore illegal, that world does not yet exist. Therefore, as long as Israel's expression of anticipatory self-defense is prompted by imminent dangers of a
88. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, THE EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR
(1979) (describing the health consequences of nuclear war); COMMITTEE FOR THE COMPILATION OF MATERIAL ON DAMAGE CAUSED BY THE ATMOIC BOMBS IN HIROSHIMA
AND NAGASAKI, THE PHYSICAL, MEDICAL AND SOCIAL EFFECTS OF THE ATMOIC
BOMBINGS

(1981) (documenting the short- and long-term effects of the attacks).
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considerable magnitude and is executed in conformance with expectations of discrimination, proportionality,89 and military necessity, 90 the
preemption option could be manifestly lawful.
A passage in the Odyssey speaks of two gates, one of horn and one of
ivory. Through the ivory gate false dreams pass to humankind, and
through the gate of horn go only the true and prophetic dreams. At this
moment in its precarious history, Israel may be tempted by the ivory
gate, choosing to base preservation of the Third Temple upon fanciful
visions of regional solidarity and good intentions (a temptation encouraged, to be sure, by the global community as a whole).-As we have
seen, however, Israel would be better off to pass instead through the gate
of horn, preparing to use military force selectively and preemptively in
order to endure. Without rejecting the peace process, this decision might
occasion greater pain in the short run, but it would base preservation of
the Third Temple upon altogether sober assessments of Realpolitik and
would affirm, rather than reject, the normative obligations of international law.
89. Regarding assassination as such an expression, particularly in regard to enemy
heads of state, it could endanger the fragile structure of international stability and comity. Such forms of preemption could undermine or even destroy the normally functioning
constraint of interstate reciprocity in international law. Whereas states ordinarily refrain
from assassinations to protect their own leaders and public officials, a reversal of this
customary restraint, and therefore, an expanded willingness to kill counterparts in other
states, could unleash a chain reaction of transnational assassinations and a substantial
breakdown of diplomatic relations. These facts notwithstanding, circumstances do exist in
which the prospective costs to a state of refraining from assassination would greatly exceed the prospective gains. Admittedly, calculation of these costs is inherently subjective,
but a fixed and flat Israeli rejection of assassination per se would likely mean absorption,
on occasion, of substantial military harms, or tolerance of genocide or related crimes
against humanity. Therefore, the reciprocity breakdown consequences of loosened rules
on assassination must normally inhibit the killing of officials in other states. However,
when states judge the expected costs of refraining from assassination to exceed these
consequences, assassination could represent the rational option. Jurisprudentially, this
utilitarian calculation expresses the principle of proportionality in international law.
90. Pufendorf provided an early expression of limits under the law of war
As for the force employed in war against the enemy and his property, we should
distinguish between what an enemy can suffer without injustice, and what we
cannot bring to bear against him, without violating humanity. For he who has
declared himself our enemy, inasmuch as this involves the express threat to bring
the worst of evils upon us, by that very act, so far as in him lies, gives us a free
hand against himself, without restriction. Humanity, however, commands that, so
far as the clash of arms permits, we do not inflict more mischief upon the enemy
than defense, or the vindication of our right, and security for the future, require.
See SAMUEL PUFENDORF, 2 ON THE DUTy OF MAN AND CIzEN ACCORDING TO
NATURAL LAW 139 (Herbert F. Wright trans., 1927).

